[Column] The harder US pushes N.Korea to denuclearize, the greater the risk to S. Korea

all > Editorial & Opinion[Column] The harder US pushes N.Korea to denuclearize, the greater the risk to S. KoreaPosted on : 2026-06-28 08:52 KST Modified on : 2026-06-28 08:52 KSTFacebook 페이스북Twitter 트위터It’s time to begin discussing the North Korean nuclear issue as part of a broader dialogue on creating a world without nuclear war or weapons North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and US President Donald Trump during a summit.

(still from YTN) The war of nerves surrounding the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula — or more specifically, North Korea’s denuclearization — persists. While the US in mid-May reaffirmed the principle of denuclearization at its summit with China, Beijing maintained strict silence on the issue. No mention of denuclearization was made at Chinese President Xi Jinping’s summit with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un in Pyongyang on June 8-9.

Instead, the two sides agreed to upgrade bilateral relations to a “strategic partnership” and greatly boost exchanges and cooperation in a range of fields, including the economy. Two days later, South Korea and the European Union agreed in a summit to “reaffirm their commitment to the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.”Seoul has constantly reaffirmed the denuclearization principle with its allies based on the judgment that it aligns with national interests and security.

But an objective assessment is needed on whether the adherence to denuclearization truly serves national interests. This is because if each issue is examined individually — from the proposed US-North Korea summit that the Lee Jae Myung administration has strongly pursued to potential scenarios if Washington gets tougher about denuclearization — the outcomes could harm South Korea’s national security and interests. Issues must be scrutinized from the perspective of preventing war, which is of vital importance to the country.

First, the possibility of North Korea — or the DPRK*, as it prefers to be known — agreeing to talks with the US on denuclearization has grown even more remote since the Kim-Xi summit. This means that Pyongyang will agree to a meeting with Washington only if the US drops its demand for denuclearization. Consequently, if the Lee administration wants to contribute to the holding of such talks, it must propose to the Trump administration to drop the demand for denuclearization.

While the likelihood of this is low, what is clear is that insisting on denuclearization and holding a summit are mutually exclusive.A hypothetical scenario has US President Donald Trump, who eagerly seeks dialogue with Kim, initially agreeing to set aside denuclearization to make the summit happen, only to bring up the topic in their meeting. What would happen then?

Talks would likely break down. The same would be true even if Trump agreed on denuclearization being a long-term goal and proposing a start with discussions on “freezing and reducing” the DPRK’s nuclear program and corresponding measures. This is because Pyongyang considers denuclearization a subject not up for discussion and a thing of the past.

Nevertheless, the stronger the US pushes for the dismantling of the DPRK’s nuclear weapons, the more South Korea’s interests and security will inevitably be jeopardized. Many experts, both at home and abroad, agree that the Kim regime has no chance of giving up its nuclear capabilities. This could lead to the DPRK, which seeks to become a permanent nuclear state, confronting the US, which is serious about denuclearization, raising uncertainty over the peninsula’s security to the extreme.

For instance, suppose that Trump, a believer in the “madman theory” of foreign policy, mobilizes maximum pressure by saying the DPRK must give up its nuclear weapons and that this is possible through dialogue or other means.How would Pyongyang react if Trump again throws verbal bombs like “fire and fury” or “total destruction of North Korea,” as he did in 2017? What if the US does not stop at threats, but flies strategic bombers skimming the Military Demarcation Line and North Korean airspace as attempts at intimidation, as it did in September 2017?

Pyongyang was unaware of these actions at the time, but what if it detected them now, given its stronger intelligence capacity? With its nuclear capabilities much higher than in 2017, the DPRK would respond strongly under its principle of “words for words” and “actions for actions.”When tension between the US and the DPRK escalates to a volatile level this way, the South Korean economy will suffer a severe blow.

Brinkmanship between Pyongyang and Washington in the second half of 2017 was based on the calculation of one side negotiating from a position more advantageous than the other. But if military tension rises again, the situation will be qualitatively different because, unlike nine years ago, there is no clear way to turn the crisis into an opportunity for negotiation.In June last year, the US launched Operation Midnight Hammer against Iran, which